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NOTE
An Evidence-Based Objection to Retributive Justice
Brian T.M. Mammarella
Abstract:
Advancements in neuroscience and related fields are beginning to show,
with increasing clarity, that certain human behaviors stem from uncontrolled,
mechanistic causes. These discoveries beg the question: If a given behavior
results from some combination of biological predispositions, neurological
circumstances, and environmental influences, is that action unwilled and
therefore absolved of all attributions of credit, blame, and responsibility? A
number of scholars in law and neuroscience who answer "yes" have considered
how the absence of free will should impact criminal law's willingness to justify
punishments on the basis of retribution, with some arguing that criminal law
ought to dispense with retributive justice because the concept of blameworthiness
is out of touch with scientific reality. This Note posits a more practical reason for
reform by reviewing available empirics on the way people perceive human
agency. The research suggests that as the science of human agency becomes
increasingly vivid and reductionistic, laypeople will become proportionally less
willing to attribute blame, and these shifting societal intuitions will ultimately
diminish criminal law's moral credibility. The practical effects of low moral
credibility might include diminished compliance, cooperation, and acquiescence
with criminal laws, as well as increased general deviance. Importantly, this Note
observes that these effects will likely manifest even if people retain a belief in
free will. Further, ontological reality plays no part in this Note's argument;
whether we in fact have free will is irrelevant. This Note instead contributes to
the discourse by highlighting the implications of oncoming shifts in lay
conceptions of both particular behaviors and the natural world writ large.
* J.D., 2015, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., 2012, College of William &
Mary. I am indebted to Professors Barbara Spellman and Richard Bonnie for their helpful
insights, guidance, and criticisms; Professor Paul Sheldon Davies, whose seminars inspired
this Note; the editorial staff of the Yale Journal ofHealth Policy, Law & Ethics for their input
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INTRODUCTION
"All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it."' Samuel
Johnson's centuries-old aphorism captures the core free will problem in a choice
few words-that is, that although our decisions and actions truly feel willed, a
scientific worldview presupposes that every event is wholly the product of
mechanistic, observable causes that seem to preclude a transcendent moment of
agency.2 Despite its elegance, Johnson's aphorism invites the same pejorative
question as the free will debate writ large: who cares? Although laypeople are
largely aware of the fate-versus-free-will distinction and have their own views on
human agency,3 the meat of this debate, like so many other topics in ontology and
metaphysics, can be criticized as "unreal, impractical, or unimportant."' Aside
from the occasional news article' or television program,6 daily life rarely prompts
people to ponder whether their actions are willed or determined by a complex
matrix of past causes (an ontological theory called "determinism")j and the
arguments of the philosophers and theorists who do take the question seriously
seem to echo in the closed loop of academia, not a legislative hall. Thus, the
word "theory" in Johnson's aphorism may carry an unintended descriptive load:
the free will debate is too conceptual to change the way we conceptualize, engage
with, and structure our society.
Recent discoveries in neuroscience, genetics, biology, and the behavioral
sciences, however, have shaken the dust off the free will debate and thrust it into
the popular fore by painting vivid pictures of the causal mechanisms that drive us
1 PAUL SHELDON DAVIES, SUBJECTS OF THE WORLD; DARWIN'S RHETORIC AND THE
STUDY OF AGENCY IN NATURE 137 (2009) (quoting JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL
JOHNSON 291 (1924)).
2 See id. at 139.
3 See Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A New
Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449, 474-75
(2013) (reporting the results of studies showing that people tend to think human decisions are
"undetermined by prior causes" and that our "universe [is] indeterministic rather than
deterministic").
4 John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization ofResponsibility in
the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2045 (1988).
5 See, e.g., David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, ATLANTIC (June 7, 2011, 4:58 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/the-brain-on-trial/308520; Tania
Lombrozo, Blame Your Brain: The Fault Lies Somewhere Within, NPR (June 16, 2014, 2:30
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2014/06/16/322556750/blame-your-brain-the-fault-lies-
somewhere-within; Dennis Overbye, Free Will: Now You Have It, Now You Don 't, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/science/02free.html.
6 Jim Fallon, Exploring the Mind of a Killer, TED (July 16, 2009),
https://www.ted.com/talks/jim fallon exploring the mind of a killer/transcript?language=e
n.
7 See Hill, supra note 4, at 2049 (defining determinism).
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to act.8 Whereas past studies on uncontrolled determinants of human behavior
were largely correlational,' new research on the neurological, genealogical, and
endocrinal underpinnings of conscious decisionmaking have illuminated an
increasing number of links in the causal chain of given behaviors.o These
discoveries, which this Note collectively terms "the new science of human
agency,"" are making it increasingly apparent that certain behaviors are the
product of biological processes over which we have no control. In short, the
second half of Johnson's aphorism-that "experience [is] for" free will-is
losing ground. 12
Consider the following three findings that, by one neuroscientist's account,
evidence and exemplify a recent trend in neuroscience that will force us to
"challenge our sense of self." 3 First, there is some evidence to suggest hat those
who feel they were born the wrong sex exhibit the neurophysiology of the sex
with which they identify. In particular, in these individuals' brains, a certain
nucleus within the hypothalamus whose size is sex-specific is the right size
according to their gender identity, but the wrong size according to their
chromosomes, organs, hormones, and other phenotypical traits.14 Second,
8 See Stephen Morse, Neuroscience and the Future ofPersonhood and Responsibility, in
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 113, 115, 121 (Jeffrey Rosen &
Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) (asserting that the deterministic premise that humans are "victims
of neuronal circumstances" has begun to exert "a strong pull on the popular, educated
imagination").
9 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will
or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 619-49 (1998) (summarizing research on the
predictive value of genetics, hormones, neurophysiology, intellect, and sociological
influences).
10 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 456-58 (describing a confluence of neuroscientific, genetic,
and sociological research that, when combined, provide both "causal explanation and data on
mechanism[s]" underlying antisocial behavior); Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and
the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON 1787, 1787
(2004) (" [N] eurobiology is beginning to provide the first hints of mechanistic explanations for
our personalities, propensities and passions."); Eagleman, supra note 5.
11 For a full explanation of this term, see infra Section III.B.
12 See DAVIES, supra note 1, at 137-69 (arguing, with far more elegance and persuasive
force than this parenthetical can hope to capture, that Johnson's aphorism is collapsing under
the weight of scientific discoveries which collectively indicate that "we are blind to the
nonconscious capacities of our minds that generate in us the illusions regarding our agency").
13 See Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1787.
14 Id. This description summarizes a single study conducted in 2000 with findings
largely limited to "male-to-female" transgender subjects. Frank M. Krujiver et al., Male-to-
Female Transsexuals Have Female Neuron Numbers in a Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2034, 2034 (2000). The truncated description of
transgender individuals above is meant to parallel researchers' description of that subgroup as
those who "experience themselves as being of the opposite sex, despite having the biological
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scientists can eliminate sexual promiscuity in certain mammalian species-in
other words, change them from polygamous to monogamous-through gene
therapy that enhances certain neurochemical reward receptors in the nucleus
accumbens." Third, Huntington's disease, a neurodegenerative disorder whose
early symptoms can include increased aggression, hypersexuality, poor social
judgment, and impulsivity, results from the mutation of one specific gene among
tens of thousands.1 6 A common thread uniting these three examples is that each
demystifies, to some degree, a particular personality trait, propensity, or behavior
by elucidating one or more of its neurological and biological substrates. If the
human affect is a car, the new science of human agency is a mechanic who has
popped the hood to see how she runs.
Although these and similar findings fail to provide complete explanations for
why different behaviors and propensities arise, the fraction of the causal matrix
they do clarify has inspired some to reconsider popular notions of moral
responsibility.1 7 That is, if human thoughts and actions are the product of
uncontrolled causes that include biological and neural mechanisms, genetic
predispositions, and past experiences (the basic premise of determinism)," do we
still deserve credit or blame for our actions? Attempted answers to this question
vary widely, but generally fall into two categories. Those who answer "yes" call
themselves "compatibilists" to reflect the idea that causally determined actions
behind gender identity continues to suggest that a detectable correlation may exist between
neurological morphology and experienced gender. See Francine Russo, Is There Something
Unique About the Transgender Brain?, SCI. AM. MIND (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-there-something-unique-about-the-transgender-
brain (summarizing recent studies finding differences in the subcortical, cortical, and steroid-
response features of the brain).
15 See Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1788. Again, more recent studies have further
suggested that differences in neurochemical signaling within the nucleus accumbens can cause
intra- and interspecies variation in social behavior. See Alaine C. Keebaugh et al., RNAi
Knockdown of Oxytocin Receptor in the Nucleus Accumbens Inhibits Social Attachment and
Parental Care in Monogamous Female Prairie Voles, 10 Soc. NEUROSCIENCE 561, 566
(2015).
16 See Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1787.
17 See, e.g., Paul Bloom, Free Will Does Not Exist. So What?, CHRON. REV. (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://chronicle.com/article/paul-bloom-free-will-does-not/131170; Hilary Bok, Want To
Understand Free Will? Don't Look to Neuroscience, CHRON. REV. (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://chronicle.com/article/hilary-bok-want-to-understand/131168; Jerry A. Coyne, You Don't
Have Free Will, CHRON. REV. (Mar. 18, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/jeny-a-coyne-you-
dont-have/131165; Michael S. Gazzaniga, Free Will Is an Illusion, but You're Still
Responsible for Your Actions, CHRON. REV. (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://chronicle.com/article/michael-s-gazzaniga-free/131167.
18 See John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self Toward a
Reconciliation ofNaturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 330 (1997).
293
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can be "free" under certain circumstances, such as when those actions result from
conscious deliberation or rational thought." Most theorists hold this
"metaphysically modest" view of free will. 20
So-called "incompatibilists," by contrast, point out that preserving a
distinction between willed and unwilled behavior is purely semantic if our
thoughts and behaviors-even conscious and rational ones-are the inevitable
result of uncontrolled causes.21 Thus, incompatibilists believe that free will and
moral responsibility are impossible in a deterministic world.2 2 A third worldview,
"libertarianism," rejects determinism altogether and thus broadly preserves the
possibility of free will. 23 Because libertarian theories posit that humans have a
special capacity to transcend the natural world, academics largely reject
libertarianism as a "metaphysically immodest conception of the human actor."24
Among laypeople, however, libertarianism has considerable traction.25
The new science of human agency has sparked a closely related debate in
legal academia-namely, whether a criminal justice system that justifies
punishment in part on retributive grounds should change in light of empirical
evidence casting doubt on the traditional notion that humans are self-causing
agents.26 This debate has focused on whether, as a theoretical matter,
19 See Gazzaniga, supra note 17.
20 Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'y LONDON 1775, 1776-77 (2004)
(describing "compatibilism" as the "dominant view among philosophers and legal theorists"
and the official basis for "current legal doctrine").
21 See OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 129 (1st ed. 2014). Put
differently, incompatibilists decline to characterize rationally made, thoughtful decisions as
"free" because, in a deterministic world, those underlying rationalizations and thoughts were
themselves the product of past causes. Under this paradigm, then, there is no aspect of a given




24 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 462-63; Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral
Responsibility, 75 PHIL. STUD. 5, 18 (1994).
25 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 479 ("[T]he folk concept of free will seems libertarian."); Anders
Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1116, 1139 (2005); cf
Eddy Nahmias, Folk Fears About Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism vs.
Reductionism, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 215, 216 (2006) (paraphrasing experimental
findings suggesting that "in certain conditions, most people express incompatibilist and
libertarian intuitions"); Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in the Age of "Mind-Reading,"
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1218 (2009) (same).
26 See generally Atiq, supra note 3, at 458-65 (describing the debate between reformists
and their critics). Criminal punishment has four traditional justifications. In additional to
retribution, these include deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See Michele Cotton,
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foundational principles and specific doctrines of criminal law require the actors
within its system to have free will.2 7 For example, proponents of reform argue
that because both the moral theories underlying the American legal system and
specific rules like the voluntary act requirement, insanity defense, and other
excuse defenses presuppose the existence of free will, the new science of human
agency ought to drive revisions.28 Critics of the reformists generally respond that
free will is not foundational to criminal law and that, even if it is, the free will
debate described above is far from settled.29 This back-and-forth reveals that
although the debate addresses important issues of fairness, egalitarian distribution
of punishment, and civil liberty, it, much like the free will problem itself, is
largely theoretical. Reform plainly has practical consequences, but both sides of
the debate have failed to construct evidence-based arguments that their proposed
course of action will in fact maximize the societal benefits of criminal law.30
For example, two particularly prominent reformists, Professors Joshua
Greene and Jonathan Cohen, have made the controversial "empirical
prediction"31 that scientific advancements will gradually drive laypeople to doubt
the "common sense, libertarian conception of free will and the retributivist
thinking that depends on it." 32 This claim's persuasive value, however, is dubious
in light of two objections. First, Green and Cohen fail to offer any evidence-for
example, from surveys or the science of human cognition-that this widespread
moral evolution will in fact occur (the "substantiation objection"). Second, Green
Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L.REV. 1313, 1313 (2000).
27 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 465.
28 See id. at 458-59.
29 Id. at 463-66.
30 See infra Section I.B (describing reformist arguments and conservationist responses).
31 See Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1781.
32 Id. at 1776, 1781 (characterizing their argument as amounting to "an empirical
prediction that ... as more and more scientific facts come in, providing increasingly vivid
illustrations of what the human mind is really like, more and more people will develop moral
intuitions that are at odds with our current social practices"). Ideas akin to Greene and
Cohen's have attracted considerable attention both inside and outside academia. In 2007, the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation announced an initial investment of $10
million to fund research on the intersection between law and neuroscience. The fund's
establishment was inspired in part by a building wave of both academic and mainstream
literature, including Greene and Cohen's work, that, according to the Foundation, has upset
centuries-old notions of human nature and posed an important question: "How would the law
deal with theories that suggest that people's actions are not the direct result of prior intentions,
that free-will is an illusion, that consciousness itself is a mere penumbra of the brain's
activities?" Jonathan Fanton, President, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found.,
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and Cohen fail to offer any evidence that the moral evolution will have any
particular effects that suggest reform is in order (the "practicality objection"). For
that reason, their argument amounts to an armchair prediction based on intuitive
assumptions instead of empirical evidence.
This Note draws from three strands of research to address each shortcoming:
studies on the moral credibility of criminal law, the folk psychology of free will
and moral responsibility, and the new science of human agency. By considering
these bodies of research in concert and comparing them to American criminal
law doctrine, this Note assesses the empirical credence of Greene and Cohen's
prediction and suggests its practical implications if true. Ultimately, this Note
argues that lay perceptions of culpability will, in fact, adjust alongside the
increasing degree to which natural, physiological explanations exist for given
criminal behaviors. It next concludes that if the law fails to reflect these changing
societal perceptions, the American justice system's regulatory strength will
gradually erode.
The first strand of research, which relates to moral credibility, addresses the
practicality objection by describing the concrete effects of perceived injustice.
Studies on moral credibility suggest that when moral intuitions do not align with
the moral principles reflected in criminal laws, society becomes incrementally
less willing to acquiesce, assist, and defer not only to those same criminal laws,
but also to completely unrelated laws.33 Thus, available evidence suggests that if
Greene and Cohen's prediction that scientific advancements will eventually
undermine popular conceptions of free will is correct, the resultant clash between
society's morals and retributive aspects of criminal law will diminish the latter's
efficacy.
The second and third strands address the substantiation objection by showing
that neuroscience and related fields are progressing in ways that have been shown
to diminish people's penchant for retribution. The second strand, which examines
lay intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, collectively reports that
although people largely believe in a robust notion of free will,34 they attribute less
blameworthiness to criminals whose behaviors resulted from an obvious and
specific set of causal antecedents.35 The clearer the causal chain, the less culpable
33 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 6-7 (1995); Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson,
Perceptions ofFairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts ofLegitimacy
andMoral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 258-62 (2012); Paul H. Robinson et al.,
The Disutility ofInjustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1995-97 (2010).
34 See sources cited supra note 25.
35 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 127-50; Sasso, supra note 25, at 1221;
Azim F. Shariff et al., Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of Human Nature
Reduces Retribution, 25 PSYCHOL. SC. 1563, 1568 (2014); Azim F. Shariff & Kathleen D.
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an actor appears. The final strand suggests that recent studies, particularly in
neuroscience, genetics, and sociology, are beginning to illuminate more and more
segments of the causal matrix underlying given behaviors.36 Thus, it appears that
the new science of human agency will have downstream effects that ultimately
support Greene and Cohen's calls for reform: an increasingly naturalistic picture
of human behavior causes less retributivism; less retributivism diminishes moral
credibility (assuming static criminal law doctrine);3 7 and a widespread erosion of
criminal law's moral credibility portends declining efficacy.
This Note proceeds by building this cascading chain of inferences in three
Parts. Part I describes the current state of the debate on whether modem science
should catalyze doctrinal changes and clarifies the discursive void this Note aims
to fill. Part II responds to the practicality objection by describing how
population-wide changes in conceptions of morality can incrementally weaken
the effectiveness of the justice system. Part III argues that the new science of
human agency presents a looming moral credibility problem for criminal law in
light of likely shifts in the folk psychology of desert.
Before launching into discussion, however, I offer one last clarifying proviso
critical to understanding this Note's logical structure: The argument that follows
assesses the implications of human perception, not ontological reality. Put
differently, all that matters for present purposes are people's views on free will
and human responsibility, not whether free will and responsibility in fact exist.
Accordingly, this Note neither defends determinism nor depends on it as a logical
premise. Instead, this Note constructs an evidence-based objection to
retributivism using available empirics that collectively reveal the striking
malleability of human blame attributions, some of the particular situational forces
No Conscious Control Over Their Actions?, 6 SCI. AM. 77, 78 (2014); Vincent Yzerbyt &
Anouk Rogier, Blame It on the Group: Entitativity, Subjective Essentialism, and Social
Attribution, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY,
JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 103, 123-24 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
36 See, e.g., Atiq, supra note 3, at 454-57; Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1794; see
generally DAVID M. EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF THE BRAIN (2011)
(describing a number of unconscious and nonconscious substrates of human behavior and
decisionmaking); JAMES FALLON, THE PSYCHOPATH INSIDE: A NEUROSCIENTIST'S PERSONAL
JOURNEY INTO THE DARK SIDE OF THE BRAIN 9 (2013) ("In my mind, we are machines, albeit
machines we don't understand all that well, and I have believed for decades that we have very
little control over what we do and who we are. To me, nature (genetics) determines about 80
percent of our personality and behavior, and nurture (how and in what environment we are
raised) only 20 percent.").
37 Commentators often bemoan the seemingly glacial pace of criminal law's response to
innovation-both scientific and otherwise. See, e.g., Richard Addelstein, Victims as Cost-
Bearers, 3 BUFF CRIM. L. REV. 131, 169 (1999); Michael Rustad, Private Enforcement of
Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 11 S.C. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 96 (2001); infra note 41.
297
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that affect our willingness to punish others, and the practical effects that rear
when the law punishes people in ways we do not think it should. While some
theorists have used the new science of human agency to argue that free will is an
illusion and retributivism is unjust,3 8 this Note repurposes that same science in
service of a comparatively modest project: assessing both the likelihood3 9 and
implications4 0 of a wide-scale recalibration of society's moral compass. Using
that approach, this Note intends to accomplish something the first paragraph of
this Introduction dismissed as unlikely: show that the free will debate has
practical import.
I. REFORM VS. CONSERVATION: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE DISCOURSE
Although commentators and theorists often decry the legal system's
incessant failure to adapt to relevant scientific developments,4 1 evidence-based
changes do occur on occasion. Consider the example of eyewitness experts.4 2 In
light of scientific evidence suggesting that eyewitness identification evidence is
categorically unreliable and responsible for a significant number of wrongful
convictions, many jurisdictions have begun allowing expert witnesses to help the
jury properly weigh identification testimony by summarizing the helpful science
in court.4 3 In this example, the relevant science and attendant legal changes were
both somewhat narrow in scope.
This Part describes a far more ambitious call for reform based on an
ontological proposition synthesized from a vast array of scientific findings. A
summary of these reformists' charge is as follows: Because the new science of
human agency calls into question traditional conceptions of human responsibility,
aspects of criminal law based on those outdated conceptions are unjustifiable.4 4
Discussion in this Part proceeds by first describing aspects of the criminal
law that reformists aim to change-namely, criminal law's foundational
38 See infra Section I.B.
39 See infra Part III.
40 See infra Part II.
41 See, e.g., Viktoras Justickis, Does the Law Use Even a Small Proportion of What
Legal Psychology Has To Offer?, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: BRIDGING THE GAP 224, 225-27
(David Canter & Rita Zukauskiene, eds., 2008) (asserting that "psychology rarely informs the
law in practice"); Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1788 (" [T]here are an ever-increasing number of
realms in which the legal system has made little headway incorporating neurobiology.").
42 See generally Brian L. Cutler & Gary L. Wells, Expert Testimony Regarding
Eyewitness Identification, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: CONSENSUS AND
CONTROVERSY 100 (Jennifer L. Skeem et al. eds., 2009) (arguing for the use of expert
witnesses to evaluate the appropriate credibility of eyewitnesses' testimony).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1776; Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1788;
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dependence on retributivism, as well as specific doctrines and defenses that in
some way contemplate the offender's capacity for volition. Next, it describes the
positions of reformists, who feel that current law ought to change in light of the
new science of human agency, as well as responses from conservationists, who
argue the opposite. This Part concludes by identifying a gap in the literature that
this Note aims to fill.
A. Free Will's Place in Criminal Law
Because reformists contend that the new science of human agency calls into
question common attributions of blame and moral responsibility, their proposals
for reform present radical changes implicating both criminal law's foundational
premises and specific criteria for criminal responsibility.45 Although part of the
debate involves different interpretations of the criminal law as written, some of
the criminal law's underlying premises and specific doctrines are
uncontroversial. Both sides agree that black-letter tenets of the criminal code
largely do not allow defendants to use the new science of human agency to
construct "volitional impairment" defenses-for example, that the criminal is not
blameworthy because his criminal conduct was the product of a genetic
predisposition triggered by environmental stimuli. Criminal law, as currently
structured, largely precludes these sorts of defenses because it assumes human
actors have some form of free will, a foundational premise that permeates
specific doctrines.
Blame, responsibility, and free will play preeminent roles in the criminal
justice system; these concepts are in some sense "foundational."46 Indeed, this
idea is hornbook law:
The criminal law is based on the capacity of the individual to
make free choices and the assumption that virtually all of our
behavior virtually all of the time is a result of free choice. This
may or may not be a description of reality. But the criminal law
as we know it cannot function without the hallmarks of
responsibility, blame, and punishment as the working premises
for most behavior.
Thus, instead of construing human agents in ways that are rigorously
naturalistic and scientific, criminal law operates by presuming we all have some
45 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 458-60.
46 Id. at 458, 465; see Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1783 (reformist); Morse, supra note
8, at 123-24 (conservationist); Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1793 (reformist); Eagleman, supra
note 5 (reformist).
47 PETER W. Low, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES: CRIMINAL LAW 199 (3d ed. 2007).
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capacity for free will and moral responsibility that might justify retributive
punishment.4 ' Accordingly, Professor Stephen Morse characterizes criminal
law's view of the human actor as "folk psychological" in that, in the law's eyes,
criminal behavior must be describable using the presence or lack of colloquial,
familiar mental states (for example, murderous rage or a premeditated intent to
kill). 4 9 Although this folk psychological view of the human actor is arguably
"primitive [and] pre-scientific,"o it has endured as a descriptive tenet of the
criminal law's current organization. No matter what scientists and philosophers
say about our volitional capacities, the law presumes that humans have free will
in some sense of the term."
This underlying assumption-that humans have "the general capacity for
rationality" and the ability to "understand the good reasons for action
and . . . conform[] to legal requirements through intentional action or
forbearance52 -permeates specific criminal law doctrines, including the
voluntary act requirement, required culpable mental states, and defenses of
excuse.53 As a result, it is difficult under current doctrine to earn acquittal using a
volitional impairment defense under any of those three theories.
Take, for example, the insanity defense, which "has traditionally been
understood as vindicating the free will assumption"" and rarely succeeds. The
insanity defense has two variations-the cognitive dysfunction test and the
control dysfunction test. Typical formulations of the cognitive dysfunction test
require the defendant to show that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of
his action.6 The control dysfunction (or "irresistible impulse") test, by contrast,
48 See Morse, supra note 8, at 127 ("At present, the law's official position [is that]
conscious, intentional, rational and uncompelled agents may properly be held
responsible .... ); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brown, 905 P.2d 527, 535 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995) ("The legal model's postulate of free will envisions people as morally and
legally answerable for their conduct rather than as pigeons in a Skinner box. By contrast, the
scientific model in most schools of psychology is largely deterministic . . .
49 See Morse, supra note 8, at 127.
50 Id. at 124.
51 Id. Note the significance of the phrase "in some sense of the term." Reformists argue
that criminal liability depends on a libertarian notion of free will, which involves a
metaphysically robust moment of agency in which the agent transcends the laws of nature as a
true first causer. Conservationists, by contrast, argue that criminal law only requires a
compatibilist ontology in which "free" acts are those that are the product of conscious,
rational deliberation.
52 Id. at 125.
53 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 459-60; Morse, supra note 8, at 124-25.
54 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 457-58.
55 Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism out of the Criminal
Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
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enables a defendant to plead insanity even if he understood the nature of his
actions so long as he lacked the ability to control his conduct and his free agency
was "destroyed.",7 Jurisdictions differ on whether defendants may plead an
insanity defense under one or both of these theories of insanity.' Since the
illustrious John Hinckley trial and the resultant passage of the Federal Insanity
Defense Reform Act, which aimed in part to shrink the insanity defense's scope
and availability, the number of jurisdictions that allow defendants to plead
control dysfunction has shrunk to nineteen.5 9 Thirty jurisdictions allow only
cognitive dysfunction and two allow no insanity defense at all.60 Further,
regardless of the type of dysfunction pleaded, successful insanity defenses are
quite rare; one recent study indicated that defendants plead insanity in under 1%
of criminal indictments and that insanity defenses fail 71% of the time.i Thus,
American criminal codes largely reject the idea that a person whose actions were
entirely the product of uncontrolled mental and sociological processes should
earn acquittal by virtue of insanity, and in the minority that do, the chances of
succeeding on such an argument are slim.
"Diminished capacity" defenses have proved similarly unsuccessful. Under
this strategy, defendants use volitional impairment evidence to negate mens rea
4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1985) ("A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct. . . .");
Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Nev. 1979) (noting that the jury's duty under the
M'Naughten rule was to determine whether the "appellant knew the nature and quality of her
acts, had the capacity to determine right from wrong or knew whether she was doing wrong
when she committed the crime").
57 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 129-30; see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.01(1) ("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law."); Godley v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 368, 370 (Va. Ct. App.
1986) ("The defense is only available where the accused's mind has become 'so impaired by
disease that he is totally deprived of the mental power to control or restrain his act."') (quoting
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (Va. 1952)).
58 See Robinson et al., supra note 33, at 1956.
59 Melinda Carrido, Note, Revisiting the Insanity Defense: A Case for Resurrecting the
Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense in Light of Neuroscientific Advances, 41 Sw. U. L.
REV. 309, 311, 319-22 (2012) (discussing the Insanity Reform Defense Act, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 402(a), 98 Stat. 2057, 2057 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2012))).
Passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act reflected, to some degree, Congress's response to
the national furor that accompanied Hinckley's acquittal. See United States v. West, 962 F.2d
1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 1990).
60 Robinson et al., supra note 33, at 1955-56. These numbers are accurate as of 2010.
61 Cotton, supra note 55, at 18 & n.90.
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elements.62 As a practical matter, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and state law
equivalents limit this approach by preventing experts from testifying that a
particular mental disease or defect negated a defendant's culpable mental state.63
Thus, rules like 704(b) preclude experts from entering into evidence the
deterministic hypothesis that, although a given defendant's actions meet the
relevant actus reus elements, he lacked the requisite mental state-purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence6 4-because his conduct was instead the
product of subconscious, nonconscious, or otherwise uncontrolled causes. Note
that this hypothesis is contrary to the folk psychological conception of human
acts, which posits that all behavior is "at least rationalizable by mental-state
explanations."
The few innovative defense lawyers that have sidestepped 704(b) and
attempted this strategy have found mixed success. For example, in a 2007
sexual abuse case, the defendant admitted evidence that frontal lobe defects
rendered him physiologically unable to form the sort of intent or plan required
under the relevant statute.6 7 That defendant was convicted and received a
sentence of eighteen years to life.68 In the notorious "twinkie defense" case, by
contrast, a defendant successfully avoided a first degree murder conviction by
arguing that a combination of junk food and extreme stress altered his mental
state at the time of the killings. 6 9 Although these sorts of biological deficiency
cases are highly publicized, they are quite risky and exceedingly rare.70
As currently structured, the American criminal justice system offers
defendants limited means to avoid or diminish criminal liability through evidence
that their criminal behavior was causally determined by biological,
62 See id. at 18-23; see also Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REv. 269, 285 (2002) ("Diminished capacity can either be a
complete defense resulting in an acquittal, like automatism/unconsciousness, or, more
commonly, a partial defense resulting in the defendant's conviction of a lesser crime.").
63 See FED. R. EVID. 704(b); Cotton, supra note 55, at 19-20 & n.95 (listing similar state
rules).
64 These four culpable mental states were drawn from the Model Penal Code provision
that details general culpability requirements. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW
INST., Official Draft 1985).
65 Morse, supra note 8, at 123.
66 See Denno, supra note 9, at 616 (noting a series of innovative defenses in recent, high-
profile criminal cases).
67 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 457.
68 Id. at 458.
69 Denno, supra note 9, at 616-17 (referring to Dan White's diminished-responsibility
defense to first-degree murder charges for the killing of Mayor George Moscone and
Supervisor Harvey Milk).
70 Id. at 616 ("Judges and juries have not accepted most of the 'new' and highly
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neurophysiological, psychological, and environmental causes. To wit, neither the
insanity defense nor the diminished capacity defenses offer defendants reliable
means to achieve those ends. This should come as no surprise given that, as the
Supreme Court has noted, "a deterministic view of human conduct . .. is
inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system."7 '
One set of these "underlying precepts" that determinism does not offend,
however, is our criminal justice system's triad of utilitarian goals: deterring
future crime (deterrence), eradicating recidivism (rehabilitation), and removing
irreversibly dangerous criminals from society (incapacitation).72 Unlike our
system's fourth traditional goal-retribution-utilitarian goals aim only to
achieve practical benefits for society without labeling criminal misconduct as
morally right or wrong.73 For that reason, a hypothetical system founded only on
utilitarian ideals would not crumble upon the wholesale rejection of free will and
responsibility as accurate models of human behavior. In that system, each
blameless violator would receive punishments on the sole rationale that those
punishments affect behavior in ways that benefit society. Thus, although certain
aspects of the American criminal justice system currently depend on the concepts
of free will and responsibility, not all do. The question thus becomes: Given that
modem science is gradually lending stronger and stronger empirical credence to
a deterministic model of the human actor, should those aspects of our system
dependent upon concepts of free will and responsibility adapt?
B. The Debate: Reformist Arguments and Conservationist Responses
The charge for reform reduces to two principal arguments, one normative
and the other predictive: first, that current legal doctrine is unjustifiable insofar as
it assumes a libertarian notion of free will that contemporary science
overwhelmingly rejects;74 and second, that the criminal justice system reflects
societal intuitions of justice, which will soon evolve towards a deterministic
worldview in light of compelling scientific discoveries.7 These two arguments
are related; in theory, as contemporary science convinces more and more people
of the normative proposition, the criminal law will adapt as suggested in the
predictive one.
71 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978). This conjecture is either poorly
worded or evidence that the Grayson majority are incompatibilists. As noted above,
compatibilists believe that free will and blameworthiness are intelligible concepts in a
deterministic world.
72 Cotton, supra note 26, at 1316-17.
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1794; Eagleman, supra note 5.
75 See generally Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1776 (asserting that the findings of
modem science will cause widespread "rejection of free will").
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Reformists' first argument reflects the general idea that because criminal
law's bedrock principles of blame and responsibility are outdated, the law itself
is unfair, inhumane, and needlessly inconsistent with scientific reality.76
Neuroscientists David Eagleman and Robert Sapolsky each relay this view in
articles similar in structure. Both describe especially vivid neurological
mechanisms known to affect behavior before explaining why, in light of that
science, the natural world is best described as deterministic and incompatible
with moral responsibility.7 7 Eagleman, for example, reviews the science of
genetics, unconscious cognitive processes, and environmental influences before
arguing that a "modem understanding of the brain" requires "[b]lameworthiness
[to] be removed from the legal argot."78 Instead of justifying punishment on the
basis of retribution or desert, Eagleman argues, punishments should focus
exclusively on the consequentialist, utilitarian goals of deterrence, rehabilitation,
and incapacitation.
Sapolsky's position is similarly incompatibilistic. He asserts that, given the
growing body of research providing "mechanistic explanations for our
personalities, propensities, and passions," including evidence that a
malfunctioning prefrontal cortex renders some individuals biologically incapable
of making "good" decisions instead of "bad" ones, the law's focus on blame
instead of past causes is misguided.0 Accordingly, just like Eagleman, Sapolsky
recommends dispensing with retributivism, albeit in a more colorful fashion:
To understand is not to forgive or to do nothing; whereas you do
not ponder whether to forgive a car that, because of problems
with its brakes, has injured someone, you nevertheless protect
society from it.. . . [And] although it may seem dehumanizing to
medicalize people into being broken cars, it can still be vastly
more humane than moralizing them into being sinners. 8i
Whereas the neuroscientists' argument is normative, the legal theorists'
argument is perhaps best understood as predictive. Professors Joshua Greene and
Jonathan Cohen advance the provocative and much-discussed8 2 view that
although laypeople overwhelmingly believe themselves to have a robust power of
free will, neuroscientific advancements will gradually change that intuition by
revealing, with increasing clarity and vividness, that our actions are driven by
76 See sources cited supra notes 71-72.
77 Id.
78 Eagleman, supra note 5.
79 Id.
80 Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1788.
81 Id. at 1794.
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neurological and environmental processes that we cannot control.8 3 This moral
revolution, they argue, will involve society's wholesale rejection of both free will
and moral responsibility-that is, people will reject both libertarianism (robust
free will) and compatibilism ("metaphysically modest"8 4 free will)-and thus
adopt a worldview that clashes with the law's current dependence on blame and
retributivism." Accordingly, because criminal law doctrines "exist because they
more or less adequately capture an intuitive sense of justice," the law will
inevitably evolve by replacing retributivist justifications for punishment with
utilitarian ones.86
Critically, Greene and Cohen do not assert that criminal law "officially"
depends on robust free will. 7 They admit that criminal law purports to only
require a "metaphysically modest" version of free will that is compatible with
both determinism and retribution." But regardless of what the law "says,""' they
argue, it in fact depends on the intuitions that society currently ascribes to it:
libertarianism and compatibilism." That is, although it is logically coherent for
the law to use words like blame, responsibility, and just deserts even if the world
is deterministic thanks to the philosophy of compatibilism, that is an "unstable
marriage" because it is not intuitive and the law necessarily reflects societal
intuitions." Simply put, society does not see things that way, so the law does not
work that way.92 Instead, society intuitively believes criminal law punishes
people because they deserve it, an intuition that will lead people to question
criminal law once the science convinces them that determinism is true and blame
is nonsensical.
Conservationists like Professor Stephen Morse respond with two principal
objections: (1) neuroscience does not currently support the conclusion that we are
not agents; and (2) even if it does, criminal law need not change because it
embraces a form of free will that is compatible with determinism.93 First, Morse
argues that because the science of agency is still "in its infancy,"94 we cannot
83 See Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1776.
84 Id. (advocating instead for a consequentialist view of free will).
85 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
86 Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1776.
87 Id.
88 Id. (defining this view as "compatibalism").
89 Id.
90 Id. ("[W]e argue that the law's intuitive support is ultimately grounded in a
metaphysically, overambitious, libertarian notion of free will that is threatened by
determinism and, more pointedly, by forthcoming cognitive neuroscience.").
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See Morse, supra note 8, at 119-21.
94 Id. at 119.
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justifiably claim that the mental states posited by the folk psychological model
are "chimera[s]" that have zero explanatory power." At present, neuroscience
cannot yet explain "how molecules, which have no intentionality or temporal
sense, produce intentional creatures with a sense of past, present and future that
guide our lives."9 6 Watching neurons fire on a brain scanner is one thing;
providing a complete, physicalist explanation for a mental state (for example,
someone's plan to steal a jewel) is wholly another. Because current science
explains so little about these "brain-mind" and "brain-action" connections, Morse
argues, reshaping our societal institutions based on it would amount to
"neuroarrogance."97
In addition to this critique of the science, Morse emphasizes that which
Greene and Cohen concede: substantive legal doctrine does not depend on robust
free will.9' That is, criminal law does not require human agents to all be
transcendent self-causers in order to justifiably attribute blame. Criminal law
instead operates on compatibilist premises that allow the system to attribute
moral responsibility to any criminal actor with the capacity for "conscious,
intentional, [and] rational" behavior.99 We can still distinguish between the folk
psychological states of conscious behavior and unconscious or uncontrolled
behavior even in a deterministic world. Thus, at least in theory, criminal law need
not adapt if determinism is true.
C. This Note's Role in the Discourse
Morse's response to Greene and Cohen's empirical prediction is cogent but
perhaps incomplete. He argues that because science might never disprove human
agency, Greene and Cohen's envisioned moral revolution will not occur.1oo
Conservationists might object to Greene and Cohen's prediction on two
additional grounds.
First, Greene and Cohen fail to provide any evidence from the behavioral
sciences that society will completely shed a popular, prevailing belief in robust
free will, moral responsibility, and retributivism. In fact, the only scientific
evidence they do offer is research from neuroscience and cognitive genetics
95 Id. at 122.
96 Id. (criticizing the post-Enlightenment "reductionist" view of free will).
97 Id. Since this Note focuses on the significance of human perception instead of the
ontological validity of determinism, this Note takes no position on this aspect of the debate.
98 Id. at 119 ("[F]ree will plays no doctrinal role in criminal law and it is not genuinely
foundational for criminal responsibility. Nor is determinism inconsistent with the folk
psychological view of the person.").
99 Id. at 120.
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indicating that humans are hardwired to punish others.'0 ' Thus, it is doubtful
from their account that widespread beliefs in moral responsibility will erode even
in the face of scientific advancements that support a deterministic worldview.
Recall that this Note termed this apparent unlikelihood the "substantiation
objection."
Second, assuming this moral revolution does occur, its practical implications
are unclear. Greene and Cohen assert that the law will simply adapt to align with
prevailing societal views, but this account is opaque and largely unsupported in
their article. Not only do the authors fail to specify how the law will adapt, but
also why-legislators often pass laws, policies, and programs that people
disagree with on some level. Greene and Cohen fail to offer practical reasons
why we should completely reorganize our criminal law to accommodate people's
feelings aside from, perhaps, the ethereal promise of fairness. Recall that this
Note termed this the "practicality objection."
This Note offers responses to both objections. First, it responds to the
practicality objection by pointing to research on the moral credibility of
substantive criminal laws and their real-world outputs.10 2 Because studies on this
topic indicate that perceived injustice incrementally diminishes people's
willingness to comply with the rule of law, widespread rejection of one of
criminal law's foundational tenets could weaken the law's regulatory efficacy.
Second, this Note predicts that advancements in neuroscience and related
fields may in fact present a looming moral credibility problem in light of cutting-
edge research showing that people-even those who believe in robust free will-
tend to view defendants as less culpable if a granular and reductionistic
explanation exists for their conduct.'03 Because the new science of human agency
is beginning to illuminate these compelling physical explanations, people's moral
intuitions about given defendants' culpability may in fact change even if their
views on free will remain static.
That is a critical distinction worth briefly highlighting. Greene and Cohen
argue that the new science of human agency will cause broad-based changes in
criminal law once people stop believing in free will. This Note, by contrast,
argues that the new science will have the practical effect of diminishing criminal
law's efficacy in the near term even if people hold fast to libertarianism.
Finally, a quick word on this Note's discursive potency: this Note does not
purport to comprehensively argue that, as a normative matter, the criminal law
should dispense with retributivism or otherwise reorganize to accommodate
changing communal views. Instead, it is best construed as a single arrow in the
101 Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1784 (suggesting that "the impulse to exact
punishment may be driven by phylogentically old mechanisms in the brain").
102 See infra Part II.
103 See infra Part III.
307
19
Mammarella: An Evidence-Based Objection to Retributive Justice
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
reformists' quiver; an evidence-based prediction that the new science of human
agency may have important, practical implications for the criminal justice system
even if Greene and Cohen's prediction of a general moral revolution in criminal
law proves false.
II. MORAL CREDBILITY: THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED INJUSTICE
Greene and Cohen's empirical prediction that community views will soon
clash with criminal law's bedrock principles of blame and responsibility has a
number of commonsense implications.0 4 Greene and Cohen foresee one such
effect-that changes in social morality will precipitate changes in the law-but
there are surely others. For example, in theory, criminal laws that accurately
reflect society's moral intuitions about justice should constitute potent deterrents
for anyone who values social acceptance.' A criminal code that fails to wield
the power of our natural aversion to judgment, stigmatization, and interpersonal
ostracism misses out on a cost-free, powerful guarantor of compliance.0 6
Similarly, and perhaps more obviously, people are probably more likely to
comply with laws they agree with simply because they think complying is the
right thing to do.'0 7 These intuitions provide the beginnings of an answer to the
practicality objection, but recent empirics indicate we can do better.
A growing body of research suggests that aligning the law's various moral
judgments with those of society has a number of utilitarian benefits.0
Researchers generally refer to the capacity of a given law to accurately and
authoritatively reflect the moral intuitions of the relevant community as the law's
moral credibility."109 Studies have shown that consequences exist for drafting or
maintaining laws that lack moral credibility. When people disagree with a
principle of justice that a given law reflects, they are less likely to comply with
that law,110 comply with other unrelated laws,ii and cooperate with the criminal
justice system as discretionary actors (for example, as witnesses and jurors).112
Moral mismatches have also been shown to encourage deviant behavior in
104 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 6.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See, e.g., id.
108 Robinson et al., supra note 33, at 1995.
109 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 6; Bowers & Robinson, supra note 33, at
240-41; see also Robinson et al., supra note 33 (using "moral credibility" and "perceived
justice" interchangeably).
110 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 7.
111 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 33, at 262.
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general."3 Further, the relationship between a law's moral credibility and its
compliance power appears to be proportional."4 Thus, people do not simply
indicate they will comply with laws they agree with and flout the ones they do
not. Instead, the extent of subjects' past transgressions and self-reported
likelihood of future transgression tracks the depth of their moral objections to the
laws they oppose."'
Like all correlational studies, however, studies on the effects of perceived
injustice have limitations that affect their generalizability. Accordingly, to
determine whether changes in societal intuitions about free will and moral
responsibility will trigger the practical effects observed in the research, one must
examine these studies' design and methodology in search of relevant constraints.
Studies on moral credibility have employed both controlled and
observational research methods."6 In the controlled studies, experimenters
typically begin by exposing some subjects-only those in the experimental
group-to a crime, law, or conviction that the subject may or may not
characterize as just." 7 Methods of exposure include mock newspaper articles,
mock television news reports, or simply telling the subject about the crime or
legal outcome in an interview or questionnaire."" To gauge the effects of
perceived injustice, experimenters either (1) observe subjects' frequency of
engaging in subsequent deviant behavior like stealing a penll9 or committing jury
nullification in a mock trial;1 20 or (2) rely on subjects' self-reported future
likelihood of violating the law or cooperating with the criminal justice system in
other ways.121 Those other ways include reporting known crimes to authorities,
turning in evidence to the police, and reporting their own accidental violations.122
Observational studies, by contrast, have the benefit of examining the effects
of real-life exposure to injustice. Subjects in these studies served as jurors in
12312criminal court proceedings, committed a crime themselves,24 or knew a friend
113 See Robinson et al., supra note 33, at 2011-16.
114 Id; see also Bowers & Robinson, supra note 33, at 258 (asserting that "[m]inor
changes in moral credibility incrementally affect people's willingness to acquiesce, assist, and
defer to the criminal law").




119 Id. at 2015.
120 Id. at 2014.
121 Id. at 2011-16.
122 Bowers & Robinson, supra note 33, at 258.
123 Id. at 259.
124 Robinson et al., supra note 33, at 2012.
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or relative who suffered a legal outcome that the subject perceived as unjust.125
Thus, the behavioral aftereffects observed among these subjects might more
accurately reflect reactions to moral objections.
Importantly, the results of observational and experimental studies align.
Both indicate that maximizing the law's moral credibility brings the utilitarian
benefits of improving criminal law's potency as a deterrent and increasing the
likelihood that civilian actors will contribute to the efficacy of the system as
jurors, witnesses, and bystanders.126
These findings have a number of limitations. First, the studies indicating that
one law's low moral credibility subtly encourages people to flout other laws only
observed or asked about future transgression of minor offenses-things like
speeding, smoking marijuana, or parking illegally.127 Thus, the extent of
experimenters' observed "general deviance" effect is unknown.128 Further, the
studies' reliance on self-reporting to predict actual behavior may have been
necessary for practical reasons, but is nevertheless dubious. Subjects may or may
not be accurate judges of their own propensities, especially given that some may
have been subconsciously primed to answer in certain ways due to the nature of
preceding questions.
Finally, exposure-the method by which subjects learned that their version
of justice conflicted with the law's-poses two separate limitations. First, the
research does not indicate how likely it is that segments of the population who
disagree with a given law will in fact confront that law. People must either
experience moral mismatches directly (as a defendant or juror) or indirectly
(through news reports or interpersonal contacts); low moral credibility does not
per se diminish the law's efficacy. Because laypeople do not spend their Saturday
mornings reading their state criminal codes, direct and indirect contact are
probably the only two realistic mediums of exposure. Second, studies do not
indicate how long a given person's exposure to a moral mismatch impacts their
likelihood of future compliance. For all of these reasons, one must read the
literature with caution.
Nevertheless, the science summarized above addresses the practicality
objection by identifying certain effects that might follow shifts in society's moral
landscape. To wit, the research indicates that (1) if a person observes or hears
about a legal outcome she deems unjust, then (2) for an unknown period of time
she will be less likely to comply, acquiesce, or cooperate with at least one
125 Id. at 2015-16.
126 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 7.
127 See, e.g., Robinson et al., supra note 33, at 2011-16.
128 See Marc Le Blanc & Rolf Loeber, Developmental Criminology Updated, 23 CRIM.
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criminal law, procedure, or process. If Greene and Cohen's prediction is true-
that society will soon adopt views on human agency that directly clash with
criminal law's terms and consequences-then moral mismatches will result.
Further, so long as individuals experience direct or indirect exposure to those
terms and consequences, the research on moral credibility indicates that some
percentage of those exposed will actually change their behavior in ways that
conflict with our system's rules or impede its processes. The magnitude of this
effect is currently unclear, however, because the research provides limited
guidance on the extent to which populations will have direct or indirect exposure
to legal outputs they disagree with, the length of time problematic behavior
persists after exposure, and the number and nature of crimes that exposed
individuals are likely to violate.
A conservative application of the research on moral credibility supplies a
plausible reason for concern if the new science of human agency drives Greene
and Cohen's predicted moral revolution and our criminal law remains
unchanged. Further, because Greene and Cohen predict radical shifts in morality
that could change society's holistic views of our criminal justice system,
alternative applications of the science might predict more extreme effects. Thus,
both conservative and aggressive extrapolations indicate that, at the very least, a
gradual erosion of retributivism's moral credibility might result in practical
effects worth consideration by policymakers: criminal law may begin to suffer
diminishing compliance, cooperation, and efficacy.
III. A LOOMING MORAL CREDIBILITY PROBLEM
Part II assumes that Greene and Cohen's moral revolution will occur and
concludes that such a radical shift would precipitate practical difficulties not
mentioned in their article. This Part, by contrast, sheds that assumption and asks
whether society's intuitions will in fact change in ways that matter-that is, in
ways that will trigger the problems associated with low moral credibility. This
Part's discussion proceeds in three Sections. First, Section III.A examines a
recent strand of scientific literature that both maps folk intuitions about criminal
responsibility and explains what situational factors drive those intuitions. Second,
Section JJJ.B describes the new science of human agency and assesses whether it
will reinforce or shape the intuitions charted in Section III.A. Finally, Section
III.C builds this Note's central thesis by synthesizing these piecewise conclusions
into a single model that predicts a forthcoming moral credibility problem.
Before delving into the science, though, we must specify which folk
intuitions are relevant to examine and predict. Recall that one key aspect of
Greene and Cohen's predictive account is that the new science of human agency
will prove that both determinism and incompatibilism (or "hard determinism")
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are accurate descriptions of reality.12 9 Thus, in their view, every event in the
natural world-including all human thought and behavior-is wholly the product
of a complex matrix of causal antecedents and that state of affairs renders the
man-made concepts of free will, blame, and responsibility nonsensical.130 In their
view, you do not deserve blame for reaching into the cookie jar; you were the
hapless puppet of neuronal and environmental circumstances beyond your
control. They further argue that society writ large will also grow to adopt that
two-pronged worldview-one that both accepts determinism and rejects free will
and responsibility. 131
The only communal view relevant for present purposes, however, is a
communal view that could clash with the principles of morality reflected in
criminal law. And because the criminal law does not reflect or depend on a
deterministic worldview, folk intuitions about free will and responsibility are all
that matter. Whereas a determinist-incompatibilist from Greene and Cohen's
future world would disagree with criminal law's current fixation on retributivism
and be offended by a defendant's inability to claim a volitional impairment
defense, a determinist-compatibilist would see no problem with either. Thus, the
analysis below does not ask whether the new science of human agency will
produce determinists, but rather how the new science of human agency will
affect intuitions about free will and responsibility.
A. Folk Intuitions: Facts and Determinants
Although some scholars argue that a modem, scientific worldview
presupposes determinism as an accurate description of reality,13 2 determinism is
less popular among laypeople.133 Most people not only understand themselves as
having robust free will,1 34 but also downplay the extent to which deterministic
factors like biology and environmental circumstances drive behavior.35 1In one
129 See Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1776. Note that this position leaves open the
possibility of some notion of responsibility, although not the sort of responsibility one might
typically imagine. On their view, a criminal in a deterministic world is responsible for his
actions insofar as he can be held accountable on consequentialist grounds. Id. at 1783.
130 See id. at 1780 (developing a hypothetical "Mr. Puppet" to examine the fallacy of
human free will).
131 Id. at 1776.
132 See Hill, supra note 18, at 291, 330; Shariff et al., supra note 35, at 1563 ("Although
few people deny that humans regularly make uncoerced choices and exercise self-control,
many scientists and philosophers have taken issue with the idea that conscious humans can
generate spontaneous choices and actions not fully determined by prior events.") (citation
omitted).
133 See sources cited supra note 25 and accompanying text.
134 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 478; Shariff et al., supra note 35, at 1563.
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study, for example, participants were asked to indicate what percentage of a
given criminal act stemmed from free will as opposed to hard social
conditions.3 6 On average, respondents attributed seventy-six percent of the
conduct to free will and almost one third said the act was completely (100
percent) willed. 3 7 Further, societal beliefs in free will are similarly sturdy.
Another study found that subjects clung to a belief in free will and moral
responsibility even when asked to assume the truth of determinism.38 Thus, for
most people, free will is both real and possible in a deterministic world.13 9
In one sense, free will's durability and widespread appeal is not surprising.
Johnson's aphorism rings true in that our everyday experiences seem to
constantly confirm free will's presence. For example, the act of wagging a finger
after commanding oneself to do so produces a powerful emotion of authorship.
Intuitive appeal aside, there may be a better explanation for free will's
popularity-namely, empirical evidence indicating that a belief in free will may
itself be the product of entrenched cognitive processes operating beneath the
level of conscious awareness.140 Theorists have pointed to a number of different
systemic features of our psychology in support of this idea, among them the
so-called fundamental attribution error. This error describes people's tendency to
explain human behavior in dispositional rather than situational terms.42 Because
research shows that "individuals are especially prone to underemphasize the role
of situational factors in the context of crime and punishment,""43 one practical
upshot might be that folk explanations for behavior prevail over scientific ones
both in the jury room and as a general matter. Because reviewing the remainder
of theories supporting the idea that free will and moral responsibility are to some
degree structurally entrenched within our psyche would take more space than this
Note can spare, suffice it to say that the idea is controversial, yet plausible.
Free will's deep-rooted appeal seems to spell trouble for Greene and Cohen,
since beliefs in free will predict stronger tendencies toward retributivism.144 If
136 Id. at 487.
137 Id.
138 Nahmias, supra note 25, at 215.
139 See id. at 215-16.
140 See Davies, supra note 11, at 166-69. The supreme irony of this conjecture is not lost
on the author.
141 See id. (discussing the dual affect the theories of naYve realism and apparent mental
causation have on human perception of authorship). See generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE
ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2002) (constructing the theory of apparent mental causation,
which generally posits that the experience of conscious will results from a cognitive system
that both produces an emotion of authorship and reinforces that emotion by producing
subsequent, conflated causal explanations for the conduct in question).
142 See Atiq, supra note 3, at 476-77.
143 Id. at 476.
144 Shariff & Vohs, supra note 35, at 78.
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systemic cognitive mechanisms motivate us to preserve our beliefs in free will
and responsibility, then our intuitions may in fact never collide with the
compatibilist policies currently reflected in criminal law. Despite advancements
in science, people might nonetheless continue to see criminals as morally
responsible because our concepts of free will and blame are both intuitive and, as
Greene and Cohen admit, entrenched in our psychology.45
Research on the popularity of libertarianism and the psychology of mental
causation,'46 however, only tells half of the story. The remainder of research
mapping out communal intuitions shows that, despite an enduring belief in free
will, people exhibit a tendency to absolve criminals of blame if the biological and
situational antecedents of the criminal's behavior are vivid enough. 47 This
tendency is both consistent with the research already discussed in this Part and
supported by additional evidence. The research above indicates that people do
not instantly revert to incompatibilism when forced to contemplate a
deterministic universe; they preserve a faith in free will and responsibility. The
set of studies described below shows that, as people learn about greater and
greater portions of the causal matrix underlying different thoughts and behaviors,
they become incrementally less likely to apportion blame regardless of their
beliefs in free will.
Findings drawn from one of the first '4 large-scale attempts to measure
society's moral intuitions support the related premise that attributions of blame
diminish stepwise alongside the degree of perceived control the criminal actor
has. Professors Paul Robinson and John Darley uncovered this pattern while
performing research explicitly designed to compare communal views with the
letter of the law.14 9 Their research design was simple. Subjects read a series of
scenarios depicting various crimes being committed and assigned a liability score
to the criminal in each scenario.so The liability scores subjects gave imaginary
defendants in classic excuse defense scenarios-including insanity, involuntary
intoxication, and duress-are particularly illustrative of the sliding scale of
liability and control described above.
145 Greene & Cohen, supra note 20, at 1782 (reporting research showing that "humans
have a set of cognitive subsystems that are specialized for processing information about
intentional agents").
146 The term "mental causation" refers, as a general matter, to the mind's tendency to
drive the subjective experience of willed agency even if that conclusion departs from reality.
See sources cited supra note 141.
147 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 127-50; Nahmias, supra note 25, at 230-
31; Shariff et al., supra note 35, at 1568; Shariff & Vohs, supra note 35, at 78.
148 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 33, at 2-3 (asserting that, as of 1995, neither social
scientists nor psychologists had "mapped the contours of the moral intuitions of our culture").
149 Id. at 3, 130-50.
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To test whether society's intuitions validate or call into question the many
different forms of the insanity defense, Robinson and Darley devised seven
scenarios in which an imaginary culprit exhibited varying degrees of cognitive
deficiency (inability to know right from wrong) and control deficiency (inability
to avoid committing the crime)."' Results indicated that although both forms of
deficiency justified lower liability scores, control dysfunction elicited a more
powerful mitigation effect. 152 Further, the greater the degree of control
dysfunction, the lower the liability scores.
Subjects produced similar scores in the context of both involuntary
intoxication and duress. Researchers devised involuntary intoxication scenarios
that also varied by degree of control and cognitive dysfunction because, for most
states, elements of the involuntary intoxication defense mimic those of the
insanity defense.'53 Although subjects thought that involuntarily intoxicated
defendants were more blameworthy than insane defendants, high levels of
dysfunction predicted proportionally low liability scores in both cases. 14 The
duress scenarios depicted defendants acting under varying degrees of coercion
(from no coercion to a threat to murder the defendant's entire family) instead of
dysfunction, but, predictably, also elicited liability scores arranged on a
continuum that depended on the defendant's level of control."'
In addition to showing that society sees degrees of liability instead of
criminal law's absolutes of guilty and not guilty, Robinson and Darley's findings
provided the first hints that society equates past causes with exonerating excuses.
Each cause, no matter its type-biological, biochemical, situational, or
otherwise-mitigated subjects' blame attributions to a degree commensurate with
the cause's potency.
Recent studies have added a finer point to this sliding scale model. 116 They
reveal that learning about the low-level causal mechanisms underlying human
behavior-both with respect to a token actor's conductT or generally applicable
to all behaviorsi5s-reduces retributivism. Importantly, this correlation holds
regardless of the subjects' beliefs in free will."' Thus, knowledge of or exposure
to deterministic explanations of behavior appears to independently reduce
people's willingness to dole out just deserts.
151 Id. at 130-33; see also id. app. A at 262-65 (providing the full text of the scenarios).
152 Id. at 134.
153 Id. at 139-40.
154 Id. at 155.
155 Id. at 147-50.
156 See Shariff et al., supra note 35.
157 See Nahmias, supra note 25, at 230.
158 See Shariff et al., supra note 35, at 1568; Shariff & Vohs, supra note 35, at 78.
159 Nahmias, supra note 25, at 230.
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A study conducted in 2006 revealed that simply exposing people to
deterministic explanations for behavior does not impact their moral intuitions.160
Instead, what matters is explaining those behaviors using precise, reductionistic
terms.16 1 Subjects were given two descriptions of a deterministic world and asked
whether actors in each world deserved blame for their actions. However,
descriptions of each world differed as follows: human behaviors in the
reductionistic world were described as "completely caused by the particular
chemical reactions and neurological processes occurring in their brain, "162
whereas human behaviors in the nonreductionistic world were described as
"completely caused by the particular thoughts, desires, and plans they have."63
Responses diverged widely. Of those given the reductionistic description, only
eighteen percent and nineteen percent indicated free will and moral responsibility
were possible, respectively.164 Those given the nonreductionistic description, by
contrast, exhibited much greater ontological optimism-seventy-two percent
allowed for free will and seventy-seven percent for moral responsibility.165
One interpretation of these results is that libertarian intuitions remain strong
in the face of determinism unless the deterministic picture relayed is causally
comprehensive or otherwise vivid. Thus, its results are consistent with those of
Robinson and Darley because both suggest that, as science crowds folk
psychological explanations of behavior out of a causal chain, people become
gradually less retributive. This study suffers from major limitations, however,
including a small, nondiverse sample size (forty-nine college students),166 short
and simple explanations of both the reductionistic and nonreductionistic worlds,
and an experimental design that in no way resembles real-world blame
attributions.
A set of studies published in 2014 addressed each of these methodological
flaws and reached similar results.167 Researchers first exposed subjects to
deterministic concepts through one of three means: a scholarly article arguing
against free will; a popular science magazine article describing mechanistic
neural processes but not mentioning free will; and a semester-long introductory
neuroscience course.168 After exposure, subjects answered a questionnaire about a
fictional murderer designed to measure their desire for retributive punishment. 169
160 Id.
161 See id.
162 Id. at 230-31 (emphasis in original).
163 Id. at 231 (emphasis in original).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 231, 233.
166 Id. at 230 n.16.
167 See Shariff et al., supra note 35, at 1564.
168 Id. at 1565-68.




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol16/iss2/3
EVIDENCE-BASED OBJECTION TO RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Each experiment rendered the same result: exposure to sophisticated, fine-
grained explanations of the neural substrates underlying human behavior reduced
retributivism.170
Two important limitations of the 2014 studies bear mentioning. First, they
do not indicate how long the effects of exposure to deterministic explanations
lasts. A reduction in retributivism that lasts only the few hours during which the
vivid science is top-of-mind has little to no practical import for present purposes.
In order to meaningfully impact moral credibility, a given individual's shift in
moral values must last until exposure to the relevant criminal law. Second, the
various methods of exposure to the science were atypical. Not many people take
neuroscience courses, read science magazines, or read groundbreaking scholarly
theses. The more likely method of exposure-a popular news article-may fail to
provide the same level of granularity. The 2006 study addresses this limitation to
some degree, however, because it changed subjects' intuitions despite only
describing a marginally complex description of reality.171
Empirical indicators of society's moral propensities are new, but nonetheless
reveal a number of patterns relevant to determining whether the new science of
human agency will change society's views in ways that undermine
retributivism's moral credibility. First, although widespread beliefs in free will
are sturdy, people's views on moral responsibility appear to readily change upon
exposure to scientific explanations for behavior that crowd out the possibility of
human agency. Second, there is some evidence to suggest that this dynamic
operates on a sliding scale: the clearer the scientific explanation, the greater the
effect on subjective blame attributions. Finally, despite the limitation noted
above, the functional triggers of these moral shifts can be commonplace-
reading a magazine will do the trick. Thus, the science reasonably suggests that
when the following three criteria obtain, a given actor's tendency for
retributivism will diminish: (1) exposure (2) to a reductionistic, granular
explanation of human behavior (3) that crowds out any explanations based on
folk psychological mental states.172
Here, the term "folk psychological mental states" refers to colloquial
concepts used to describe behavior that are readily definable and coherent in
everyday discourse, but opaque in strictly scientific and materialistic terms. For
example, explaining that a burglary happened because the thief "was an
unscrupulous guy who wanted to get rich" is a folk psychological explanation.
170 Id. at 1568.
171 See Nahmias, supra note 25, at 230-31 (describing two relatively simple conceptions
of free will that were presented to research subjects).
172 Eddy Nahmias describes "folk psychology" as "inherently non-reductionistic,
explicitly requiring a role for conscious beliefs, desires, reasons, plans, and deliberations to
cause our choices and actions." Id. at 229.
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Unlike reductionistic explanations, folk psychological ones invite blame because
they seem to presuppose libertarian free will. The research supports this intuition;
if people contemplate a deterministic universe described using folk psychological
mental states instead of scientific, reductionistic terms, those people are more
likely to preserve free will and moral responsibility.
The science reviewed in this Section is by no means a comprehensive review
of the evidence relevant to addressing the substantiation objection. The volume
and breadth of evidence and causal interactions one would need to examine to
confirm or deny Greene and Cohen's prediction on empirical grounds would be
breathtakingly vast. Nonetheless, the modest body of work reviewed in this
Section suggests that, at this juncture, the idea that advancements in neuroscience
and related fields can change society's moral intuitions regardless of whether it
changes their views on free will is at least plausible. The next Section briefly
scans the new science of human agency to evaluate the likely extent of that shift.
B. The New Science ofHuman Agency
In the Introduction, this Note defined the new science of agency as an
emerging class of empirical literature characterized by a tendency to identify the
specific neurological, genealogical, and endocrinal processes that underlie given
behaviors and instances of conscious decisionmaking. Research on the causes
and effects of moral evolutions, however, indicate that these new sciences have
practical import beyond merely describing the natural world. To wit, the vivid
causal pictures they paint may change traditional communal views on blame and
responsibility in ways that may diminish retributive justice's moral credibility.
This Section aims to identify the characteristics of the new science of human
agency that make it especially likely to contribute a shift in our moral
topography. It accomplishes that task by contrasting prior scientific attempts to
explain behavior with more recent attempts.
Recall the criteria identified in Section III.A that predict a given actor's
diminished sense of retributivism: (1) exposure (2) to a reductionistic, granular
explanation of human behavior (3) that crowds out any explanations based on
folk psychological mental states. Older studies positing deterministic
explanations for human behavior generally flunk criteria (2) and (3) for a number
of reasons.
First, they were largely correlational and failed to explain the low-level
causal mechanisms that precipitated higher-order criminal behaviors. 173 For
example, studies conducted before 1988 reported correlations between
chromosomal abnormalities and increased aggression, 174 irregular
173 See Denno, supra note 9, at 619-40.
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electroencephalograph readings and murderous tendencies,7  and testosterone
production and irritability,' 7 6 but failed to explain the processes driving those
correlations.7 7  Thus, although these pre-1988 studies explained criminal
behavior using the same sort of genealogical, neurological, and endocrinal
evidence as the new sciences, their lack of specificity preserved large gaps in
causal stories that laypeople could have filled with folk psychology.
Second, pre-1988 studies in fact invited folk psychological conjectures by
relying on mental states, not physical mechanisms, as descriptive terms.s7 8
Studies reported genetic, hormonal, and cognitive abnormalities as predictive of
,i. "lack of18exaggerated maleness,"79 "aggression,"'s and "lack of discipline." By using
descriptors that are, to some degree, nonspecific and hard to pin down in
materialistic terms, early empirics gave lay observers room to infer some degree
of control on behalf of the criminal actor.
Finally, these correlational studies were widely prone to conflicting
results.18 2 If the scientific community was not convinced of the proposed causal
mechanisms' explanatory potency, how could the public?
Next-generation research, by contrast, supplants correlational data with
causal theories that delve deeply into the relevant physiological substrates of
behavior.8 3 Instead of descriptive terms that evoke mental causation, the new
sciences refer to brain states using mechanistic terms like "diminished
capacity" and "organic impairment." ,1i The human agent is thus better
understood under these postulates as a biological machine instead of a thinking,
planning actor. Further, because this deterministic conception of the human self
exerts a strong pull on the popular, educated imagination, mainstream media
175 Id. at 637-38.
176 Id. at 628.
177 See sources cited supra notes 174-176.
178 See, e.g., Denno, supra note 9, at 620, 640.
179 Id. at 620.
180 Id. at 626.
181 Id. at 644.
182 Id. at 627-31, 634-36, 640, 646-48.
183 See, e.g., Atiq, supra note 3, at 456-57; Daniel A. Martell, Causal Relation Between
Brain Damage and Homicide: The Prosecution, 1 SEMINARS CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY
184 (1996) (hypothesizing that physiological abnormalities in a particular defendant's frontal
lobe affected his volitional capacities); Peggy Sasso, Implementing the Death Penalty: The
Moral Implications of Recent Advances in Neuropsychology, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 765, 790-
91 (2007) (discussing the behavioral effects of damage to the orbitofrontal cortex); Eagleman,
supra note 5 (summarizing a body of research that, according to Eagleman, "demonstrates the
limits of the [free choice] assumption").
184 Sasso, supra note 183, at 790.
185 Sapolsky, supra note 10, at 1794.
186 Morse, supra note 8, at 127.
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outlets have disseminated stories that implicitly or explicitly endorse
deterministic sciences at a relatively high clip. For all of these reasons, the new
science of human agency meets each of the three criteria of an intuition-mover
outlined above.
Two examples best illustrate this new breed of research. Consider first the
example of the gene for monoamine oxidase A (MAOA). '8 Statistical data
evidences a robust correlation between the presence of a lower-activity MAOA
variant and criminally deviant behavior, but scientists have only recently
discovered why.'89 If an MAOA carrier experiences certain environmental
stimuli, this MAOA variant triggers a neurochemical response system that leads
to a "functional difference" in his brain regions responsible for "anger production
and control." 90 Note the temporal cohesiveness of this causal picture; it describes
the mechanisms responsible for the potentiality, genesis, and actualization of
antisocial behavior. Although presence of the MAOA variant is by no means an
independent predictor of criminality, this theory provides the sort of vivid causal
story that may diminish subjective attributions of blame towards carriers of the
lower-activity MAOA variant.
A second and perhaps more powerful example of the new science of human
agency is Sapolsky's account of prefrontal cortex (PFC) damage. The PFC has a
number of important functions, but most relevant for present purposes is its job
of "biasing an individual towards doing the 'harder' but 'more correct' behavior"
instead of impulsively succumbing to the choice that provides instant
gratification.191 Unfortunately for us, the PFC is prone to underdeveloping,
sustaining damage, or otherwise misfiring for any number of reasons-namely,
age, transient states of intoxication, blunt trauma, lesion, tumor, and neuronal
187 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5. Perhaps the most notable example of this sort of
widespread media coverage has been the story of Jim Fallon, a neuroscientist who
accidentally realized his brain shared the same physiological characteristics as murderous
psychopaths. Since his discovery, Fallon has featured in news stories, spoke in two TED talks,
and wrote a New York Times bestselling book called The Psychopath Inside. Fallon, supra
note 36; Susan Donaldson James, Scientist Related to Killers Learns He Has a Psychopath's
Brain, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/scientist-related-killers-
leams-psychopaths-brain/story?id=21029246; Fallon, supra note 6.
188 Atiq, supra note 3, at 456.
189 Id. at 456-57; Matthew L. Baum, The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic
Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials?, 6 NEUROETHICS 287,
288 (2013) ("[C]anying the low activity MAOA gene (MAOA-L) could make the subject
more prone to express aggression if provoked or socially excluded."). An Italian appeals court
in 2009 reduced a defendant's sentence for murder based on evidence that he carried this
genetic variant. Id. at 287.
190 Id. at 456 (naming "childhood maltreatment" as an example of an environmental
stimulus).
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death.19 2 When this happens, concomitant behavioral changes are remarkable.
Studies have shown that, when presented with two options, subjects with
damaged PFCs can verbalize an intent to choose the "right" option but then prove
literally unable to avoid choosing the wrong one.'93 Further, this effect is
proportional.194 Thus, the net functional capacity of any person's PFC,
measurable by metabolic rate, depicts that person's capacity to regulate
impulsivity. 95 To summarize: your PFC is one yardstick (surely of many) of
your volitional capacities.
Admittedly, research on the MAOA variant and PFC damage were chosen
because they are especially compelling illustrations of how advancements in
neuroscience and related fields are challenging traditional concepts of the human
self. But that is precisely the point. Studies like these leave little space for folk
psychology to infiltrate the causal matrix that governs behavior; in essence, they
make determinism somewhat intuitive. For that reason, it is plausible to conclude
that, in light of the three criteria above, these and related discoveries will begin to
change our moral intuitions if widely disseminated. This is especially true given
that, by all accounts, even Stephen Morse's,9 6 scientific advancements in these
fields are occurring at a blistering pace.19 7
C. Bringing It All Together: Two Dimmers and a Flip Switch
This Part has sought to contribute to the debate on whether scientific
advancements justify reforming criminal law by answering a core empirical
question: whether the new science of human agency will change society's views
on free will and responsibility, and if so, in what ways? Answering this question
accomplishes at least two things: it both addresses the substantiation objection
and illuminates another argument that reformists might make-that the new
science of human agency will have the practical effect of eroding retributivism's
moral credibility.
The research reviewed in Sections IJ.A and JJJ.B indicates that exposure to
the new science of human agency can change individuals' views on
responsibility, but not necessarily free will. While beliefs in free will appear to
remain sturdy in the face of deterministic explanations for human behavior, those




195 Id. at 1793-94.
196 See Morse, supra note 8, at 123 (indicating that neuroscientific evidence may soon
develop to the point at which it is regularly admitted in trial proceedings).
197 See Hill, supra note 18, at 291; Justickis, supra note 41, at 233 (referring to
psychological advancements); Shariff & Vohs, supra note 32, at 78.
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for given criminal acts. Unlike beliefs in free will, blame attributions are fluid
and responsive to the presence or absence of ascertainable causal antecedents that
crowd out folk psychological explanations for behavior. Further, retributivism
appears to diminish stepwise as the perceived causal power of scientific
explanations increases. The new science of human agency is in the business of
illuminating a growing spectrum of unconscious and uncontrolled determinants
of human behavior. It is therefore plausible to conclude not only that individuals'
propensities to punish retributively will decrease upon sufficient exposure to the
relevant science, but also that this effect will intensify over time.
These empirical findings lend little support to Greene and Cohen's
prediction that the new science will precipitate a widespread rejection of free
will, moral responsibility, and aspects of our criminal justice system that seem to
depend on those two concepts.198 Instead, the science reviewed by this Note
supports the comparatively modest empirical premise that exposure to
deterministic explanations of human behavior makes people view particular
criminals as somewhat less responsible for token crimes. Thus, although
intuitions might shift, this Note found no empirical evidence that those intuitions
will shift in the ways Greene and Cohen predict. Most people believe that free
will and blame apply to causally determined behaviors, albeit to varying degrees.
Whether they know it or not, most laypeople are compatibilists.
Although the body of research reviewed above does not alleviate the
substantiation objection, it does present a new argument for reformists-namely,
that changes to the criminal law may be necessary to avoid a moral credibility
problem. Recall from Part II that some evidence indicates criminal law suffers
from diminished efficacy when it produces practical outcomes that people deem
unjust. If, in the context of specific criminal cases, reductionistic explanations for
the deviant behavior exist but nonetheless fail to ensure acquittal or lesser
sentences, moral mismatches might occur once people experience direct or
indirect exposure.
To clarify this argument, consider the fact that the empirical strands
summarized in Parts II and III feature proportional continua: (1) the criminal
law's efficacy diminishes gradually alongside the widening gap between people's
moral intuitions and legal policies; and (2) defendants are seen as proportionally
less culpable as the physiological correlates of their behavior come clearer into
the fore. These can be seen as dimmer switches. The criminal law, however, is
better understood as a flip switch that primarily deals in bimodal absolutes-
guilty and not guilty.
Although sentencing guidelines enable judges and juries to apportion
punishment based on a given allowable range, criminal law is nonetheless not as
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flexible as our two dimmer switches for two reasons. First, exposure vehicles-
namely television and newspaper stories-might focus primarily on the presence
or absence of conviction and gloss over the significance of the sentence handed
down. In this scenario, those exposed to the broadcast would necessarily form a
moral judgment based on incomplete information: a verdict and a sentence
reported absent an explanation of the sentence's severity as a relative matter.
Thus, moral mismatches might form based primarily on verdicts because lay
listeners, for whatever reason, fail to appreciate the significance of sentences.
Second, sentencing guidelines have procedural constraints that bound the
continuum. These two descriptors substantiate the intuitive premise that the law's
rule-driven processes lack the seemingly limitless malleability of individuals'
shifting conceptions of justice.
To extend the metaphor, as the new science of human agency gradually
slides our retributivism dimmer switch towards "off," the criminal law flip switch
will fail to capture the same nuanced, stepwise decrease in the punishments it
hands down. Resultantly, our moral credibility dimmer switch will slide towards
"low" to a degree proportional to the mismatch created above. This rudimentary
model illustrates the empirical reality that as the gap between retributivist
tendencies and criminal law outcomes widens, moral credibility diminishes. And
a broad range of recent empirics suggests that the new science of human agency
is particularly likely to set this corrosive sequence in motion. Thus, unless the
criminal law adapts to accommodate our developing understanding of human
decision making processes, our justice system might soon face a moral credibility
problem.
CONCLUSION
Retribution-the idea that we ought to punish criminals simply because they
deserve it-plays a critical role in American legal discourse and policy. Indeed,
the degree to which a defendant is morally culpable formally justifies, in part,
imposition of the U.S. criminal justice system's ultimate sanction: the death
penalty.199 This Note's findings provide one practical reason why scientific
developments should inform the manner in which we apply the concepts of
responsibility and blame in given scenarios-namely, that failure to do so will
diminish criminal law's efficacy.
That is not to say, however, that our justice system has demonstrated a
complete failure to adapt in light of available empirics. In Roper v. Simmons, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court cited research on developmental psychology to
199 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) ("We have held there are two distinct
social purposes served by the death penalty: 'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by
prospective offenders."') (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
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support its holding that executing a minor violates the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.200 There, the Court reasoned that a minor's
irresponsible conduct is "not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult" due to
observable differences in minors' decision-making and volitional capacities.201
To wit, "scientific and sociological studies" confirmed that youths are
categorically more impulsive, susceptible to environmental pressures, and
affectively malleable than adults.202 In light of that available evidence, the Court
explained, youths are less blameworthy and therefore undeserving of extreme
retribution.2 03 The Roper Court thus explicitly attempted to accomplish that
which the science reviewed in this Note recommends: reducing criminal liability
to a degree commensurate with a given criminal actor's organic volitional
capacities.
In addition to supporting the relatively uncontroversial idea that the law
should periodically adapt in light of changing scientific realities, this Note's
findings inform a far more contentious debate: whether mounting evidence that
human behavior stems from biological, mechanistic causes suggests that our
criminal law should dispense with retributivism altogether. It does so by using
empirical evidence to construct the following argumentative framework upon
which both empiricists and legal theorists might build. As the new science of
human agency gradually illuminates an increasing number of links in the causal
chain underlying given criminal behaviors, laypeople will view those behaviors
as less blameworthy; and because the criminal law currently offers defendants
limited means to avoid liability on the basis of diminished volitional capacity,
laypeople's moral views will increasingly clash with criminal law outcomes.
These moral mismatches will, in turn, precipitate diminished compliance,
cooperation, and acquiescence with criminal laws, as well as increased general
deviance. In short, available empirics suggest that changing public perceptions
will bring adverse practical effects if the law remains static.
This argument-which amounts to an empirical prediction-supports
reformists' charge, but cannot justify broad-based reforms to our justice system
per se for two reasons. First, the looming threat of diminished moral credibility is
one of many factors surely relevant to deciding whether retributivism's costs
outweigh its benefits. Indeed, the age-old debate surrounding proper
200 Id. at 569-70, 573 (relying on "scientific and sociological studies" as well as
diagnostic practice in psychiatry).
201 Id. at 570 (quoting Thompsonv. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
202 Id. at 569-70.
203 See id. at 570. (" [T]he case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.
Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
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justifications for criminal punishment spans centuries, oceans, and disciplines,
204
and cannot be resolved by a single practical consideration. Thus, this Note's
argument is best considered a single weight on the scale in favor of reform, not a
debate-settling silver bullet. Second, methodological limitations in the research
constrain the generalizability of present findings. The research does not tell us,
for example, how frequently people are exposed to the new science of human
agency, how long exposure to the new science of human agency affects
individuals' moral judgments, or the extent to which moral mismatches drive
general criminal deviance. Thus, the degree of the looming moral credibility
problem is currently unknown. It would be premature to reorganize our criminal
justice system based on data that is, in some sense, incomplete.
Nonetheless, the thesis of this Note exposes our criminal law's dependence
on blame and responsibility as potentially antithetical to its own animating
purposes. As such, it naturally invites speculation and conjecture on an enticing
question this Note has, for reasons already discussed, hesitated to confront: what
would a criminal justice system without the concepts of retribution, blame, and
responsibility look like? In the last few lines before concluding, I succumb to
temptation and offer a brief, 50,000-foot suggestion informed by the findings
recounted above.
The broad-strokes solution is simply stated: craft a system whose sole focus
is to serve the utilitarian goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.
As noted in Section IA, a criminal convicted in this system-blameworthy or
not-would receive a sentence designed to optimally benefit society.
Importantly, however, this system would not necessarily dispense with
retribution as an articulated goal of criminal punishment or remove the concepts
of blame and responsibility "from the legal argot."2 05 Instead, because available
empirics reveal that human perception is one guarantor of (or cancer to) the
system's effectiveness, this system would preserve those concepts to the extent
that they serve, among other utilitarian ends, the function of producing outcomes
in line with then-existing moral views. For example, a hypothetical jury
explicitly instructed to consider desert and blameworthiness might hand down a
verdict that better harmonizes with widely held moral beliefs.20 6 Similarly, this
system would avoid handing down outlandishly severe punishments for
comparatively minor offenses, even if doing so were considered a maximally
204 See, e.g., Matthew Haist, Comment, Deterrence in a Sea of 'Just Deserts': Are
Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a World of 'Limiting Retributivism'?, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 790-92 (2009) (providing a brief description of this debate's history,
scope, and significance).
205 Eagleman, supra note 5.
206 In some jurisdictions, judges can and do instruct jurors to consider the purposes of
punishment in making their decision. See Cotton, supra note 26, at 1317.
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effective deterrent and rehabilitator, if that course of action sowed widespread
discontent and a corresponding diminishment of the system's moral credibility
that offset originally intended benefits. Thus, the concepts of retribution, blame,
and responsibility would function as tools readily manipulated in service of
utility, not, as is currently the case, bedrock precepts that limit criminal law's
responsiveness to ever-changing moral tides.
This model is crude and oversimplified, but nonetheless addresses the core
problem this Note has identified and offers the beginnings of a solution upon
which others may build. Further, it is in some sense noncontroversial; reformists
and conservationists agree that our system's utilitarian goals are worth
preserving. Retribution, by contrast, has proved a key sticking point due to that
concept's uncertain future. Thus, a model that repurposes retribution to serve
utilitarian ends strikes a compromise between those unsure of the normative
implications of the new science of human agency and those who champion that
science as the harbinger of retributive justice's demise. Perhaps less importantly,
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